Online advertising platforms are thriving due to the customizable audiences they offer advertisers. However, recent studies show that advertisements can be discriminatory with respect to the gender or race of the audience that sees the ad, and may inadvertently cross ethical and/or legal boundaries. To prevent this, we propose a constrained ad auction framework that maximizes the platforms revenue conditioned on ensuring that the audience seeing an advertisers ad is distributed appropriately across sensitive types such as gender or race. Building upon Myersons classic work, we first present an optimal auction mechanism for a large class of fairness constraints. Finding the parameters of this optimal auction, however, turns out to be a non-convex problem. We show that this non-convex problem can be reformulated as a more structured non-convex problem with no saddle points or local-maxima; this allows us to develop a gradient-descent-based algorithm to solve it. Our empirical results on the A1 Yahoo! dataset demonstrate that our algorithm can obtain uniform coverage across different user types for each advertiser at a minor loss to the revenue of the platform, and a small change to the size of the audience each advertiser reaches.
Introduction
Online advertisements are the main source of revenue for social-networking sites and search engines such as Google [4] . Ad exchange platforms allow advertisers to select the target audience for their ad by specifying desired user demographics, interests and browsing histories [20] . Every time a user loads a webpage or enters a search term, bids are collected from relevant advertisers [27] , and an auction is conducted to determine which ad is shown, and how much the advertiser is charged [35, 49, 55] . As it is not practical for advertisers to place individual bids for every user, the advertiser instead gives some high-level preferences about their budget and target audience, and the platform places bids on their behalf [28] .
More formally, let there be n advertisers, and m types of users. Each advertiser i specifies their target demographic, average bid, and budget to the platform, which then decides a distribution, P ij , of bids of advertiser i ∈ [n] for user type j ∈ [m]. These distributions represent the value of the user to the advertiser, and ensure that the advertiser only bids for users in their target demographic, with the expected bid not exceeding the amount specified by the advertiser [21] . At each time step, a user visits a web page (e.g., Facebook or Twitter), the user's type j ∈ [m] is observed, and a bid v i is drawn from P ij , for each advertiser i ∈ [n]. Receiving these bids as input, the mechanism M decides an allocation x(v) and price p(v) for the advertisement slot. Several Ad Exchanges including Google Ads [2] and Facebook Ads [1] , use variants of second price auction mechanism [40] 1 .
Overall, such targeted advertising leads to higher utilities for the advertisers who show content to relevant audiences, for the users who view related advertisements, and for the platform which can benefit from selling targeted advertisements [22, 23, 26, 54] . However, targeted advertising can also lead to discriminatory practices. For instance, searches with "black-sounding" names were much more likely to be shown ads suggestive of an arrest record [46] . Another study found that women were shown fewer advertisements for high paying jobs than men with similar profiles [16] . In fact, recent experiments demonstrate that ads can be inadvertently discriminatory; [34] found that STEM job ads, specifically designed to be unbiased by the advertisers, were shown to more men than women across all major platforms (Facebook Ads, Google Ads, Instagram and Twitter). On Facebook, a platform with 52% women [51] the advertisement was shown to 20% more men than women. [3] find that this could be a result of competitive spillovers among advertisers, and is neither a pure reflection of pre-existing cultural bias, nor a result of user input to the algorithm. Such (likely inadvertent) discrimination has led to two recent cases filed against Facebook, which will potentially lead to civil lawsuits alleging employment and housing discrimination [5, 30, 38, 47] .
To gain intuition on how inadvertent discrimination could happen, consider the setting in which there are two advertisers with similar bids/budgets, but one advertiser specifically targets women (which is allowed for certain types of ads, e.g., related to clothing), while the second advertiser does not target based on gender (e.g., because they are advertising a job). The first advertiser creates an imbalance on the platform by taking up ad slots for women and, as a consequence, the second advertiser ends up advertising to disproportionately fewer women and is inadvertently discriminatory. Currently, online advertising platforms have no mechanism to check this type of discrimination. In fact, the only way around this would be for the advertiser to set up separate campaigns for different user types and ensure that each campaign reached a similar number of the sub-target audience. However, online platforms often reject such campaigns in the apprehension of discriminatory practices [17, 34] . Figure 1 : When a user visits the platform, the platform accepts bids from relevant advertisers, and conducts an auction to decide the ad to be shown to the user. Different advertisers have different target audiences and only bid for users in their target audience.
Our Contributions
Our main contribution is an optimization-based framework which maximizes the revenue of the platform subject to satisfying constraints that prevent the emergence of inadvertent discrimination as described above. The constraints can be formulated as any one of a wide class of "group fairness" constraints as presented in [11] , which constrains the distribution of an ads audience across the sensitive types to ensure proportionality across types as defined by the platform. The framework allows for intersectionality, allowing constraints across multiple sensitive attributes (e.g., gender, race, geography and economic class) and allows for restricting different advertisers to different constraints.
Formally, building on Myerson's seminal work [37] , we characterize the truthful revenue-optimal mechanism which satisfies the given constraints (Theorem 4.1). The user types, as defined by their sensitive attributes, are taken as input along with the type-specific bid distributions for each advertiser, and we assume that bids are drawn from these distributions independently. Our mechanism is parameterized by constant "shifts" which it applies to bids for each advertiser-type pair. Finding the parameters of this optimal mechanism, however, is a non-convex optimization problem, both in the objective and the constraints. Towards solving this, we first propose a novel reformulation of the objective as a composition of a convex function constrained on a polytope, and an unconstrained non-convex function (Theorem 4.2). Interestingly, the non-convex function is reasonably well behaved, with no saddle-points or local-maxima. This allows us to develop a gradient descent based scheme (Algorithm 1) to solve the reformulated program, which under mild assumptions has a fast convergence rate of O( 1 /ε 2 ) (Theorem 4.3).
We evaluate our approach empirically by studying the effect of the constraints on the revenue of the platform and the advertisers using the Yahoo! Search Marketing Advertising Bidding Data [53] . We find that our mechanism can obtain uniform coverage across different user types for each advertiser while losing less than 5% of the revenue (Figure 3) . Further, we observe that the total-variation distance between the fair and unconstrained distributions of total advertisements an advertiser shows on the platform is less than 0.05 (Figure 4) .
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to give a framework to prevent inadvertent discrimination in online ad auctions.
Our Model

Preliminaries
In this section, we provide some key preliminaries. For a detailed discussion, we refer the reader to the excellent treatises [31, 39] on Mechanism design.
A mechanism M is defined by its allocation rule x : R n → [0, 1] n , and its payment rule p : R n → R n ≥0 . Truthful mechanisms are those in which revealing the true valuation is optimal for all bidders. Further, the can be shown that the allocation rule x(b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b n ), of any truthful mechanism must be monotone in b i for all i ∈ [n]. [36] proved for any mechanism M there exists a truthful mechanism τ (M) such that τ (M) offers the same revenue to the seller and the same utility to each bidder as M. As such, we restrict ourselves to truthful mechanisms. Furthermore, it is a well known fact [39] that for any truthful mechanism its payment rule p, is uniquely defined by its allocation rule x. Hence, for any truthful mechanism our only concern is the allocation rule x.
Let P be the distribution of valuation of a bidder, pdf : R → R >0 be its probability density function, and cdf : R → [0, 1] be its cumulative density function, then we define the virtual valuation φ : supp(P) → R, as φ(v) := v −(1−cdf(v))(pdf(v)) −1 . We say P is regular if φ(v) is non-decreasing in v. Likewise, we say P is strictly regular if φ(v) is strictly increasing in v.
Myerson's Optimal Mechanism. Myerson's mechanism is defined as the VCG mechanism [15, 29, 52] where the virtual valuation φ i , is submitted as the bid v i for each bidder i. If the valuations v i , and therefore, the virtual valuations φ i are independent, then for any truthful mechanism the virtual surplus i∈[n] φ i x i (φ i ), is equal to the revenue in expectation over the bids. Since VCG is surplus maximizing, if Myerson's mechanism is truthful then it maximizes the revenue. It can be shown that if the bids have a regular distribution, then Myerson's mechanism is truthful, and therefore, revenue maximizing.
Notation. Let φ ij ∈ R be the virtual valuation of advertiser i ∈ [n] for type j ∈ [m], f ij : R → R ≥0 be its probability density function, and F ij : R → [0, 1] be its cumulative density function. We denote the joint virtual valuation of all advertisers for type j by φ j ∈ R n , and its joint probability density function by f j : R n → R ≥0 . The types j ∈ [m] are distributed according to a known distribution U. Finally, given a user of type j, let a mechanism's allocation rule be x j : R n → [0, 1] n .
Fairness Constraints
We would like to guarantee that advertisers have a fair coverage across user types. We do so by placing constraints on the coverage of an advertiser. Formally, we define advertiser i's coverage of type j, q ij , as the joint probability that advertiser i wins the auction and the user is of type j
where x ij (φ j ) is the i-th component of x j (φ j ). Then, we consider the proportional coverage of the advertiser on each type. Given vectors j , u j ∈ [0, 1] n ∀ j ∈ [m], we define ( , u)-fairness constraints for each advertiser i and type j, as a lower bound ij , and an upper bound u ij , on the proportion of users of type j the advertiser shows ads to, i.e., we impose the following constraints for all i ∈ [n] and
Discussion of Fairness Constraints
Returning to the example presented in the introduction, we can ensure that the advertiser shows x% of total ads to women, by choosing a lower bound of x for this advertiser on women. More generally, for m user types, moderately placed lower bounds and upper bounds ( ij ∼ 1 /m and u ij ∼ 1 /m), for some subset of advertisers, ensure this subset has a uniform coverage across all types, while allowing other advertisers to target specific types. Importantly, while ensuring fairness across multiple types our constraints allow for targeting within any single type. This is vital as the advertiser may not derive the same utility from each user, and could be willing to pay a higher amount for more relevant users in the same type. For example, if the advertiser is displaying job ads, then a user already looking for job opportunities may be of a higher value to the advertiser than one who is not.
For a detailed discussion on how such constraints can encapsulate other popular metrics, such as statistical parity, we refer the reader to [8] .
Optimization Problem
We would like to develop a mechanism which maximizes the revenue while satisfying the upper and lower bound constraints in Eq. (2) . Towards formally stating our problem, we define the revenue of mechanism M, with an allocation rule x j : R n → [0, 1] n for type j as
where x ij (φ j ) and φ ij are the i-th component of x j (φ j ) and φ j respectively. Thus, we can express our optimization problem with respect to functions x(·), or as an infinite dimensional optimization problem as follows.
(Infinite-dimensional fair advertising problem). For all user types j ∈ [m], find the optimal allocation rule x j (·) :
where (5) encodes the lower bound constraints, (6) encodes the upper bound constraints, and (7) ensures that only one ad is allocated.
In the above problem, we are looking for a collection of optimal continuous functions x . To be able to solve this problem, we need -in the least -a finite dimensional formulation of the fair online advertisement problem.
3 Other Related Work [18] consider a framework which selects an ad category (e.g., job or housing) every time a user visits the platform. Given fair mechanisms for each category, they construct a fair composition of these mechanisms. However, they do not show how to design fair mechanisms for each category, or study how the composition affects the platform's ad revenue. Another related problem is to design optimal mechanisms which satisfy contract constraints [7, 25, 41] ; these constraints allocate a minimum number of ad spots to advertisers with a contract, and are different from our constraints which control the fraction of each sensitive type the ads are shown to.
Several prior works address the problems of polarization and algorithmic bias, including [10, 24] who control polarization in social-networks and personalized feeds, [42] who diversify personal feeds, and [12] who create a diverse and balanced summary of a set of results. In addition, [6, 13, 44 ] study fair ranking algorithms; these could be used to generate a balanced list of results on job platforms and other search engines. While these works are related to our broad goal of controlling algorithmic bias, their formulation is different since they do not involve a bidding mechanism. Therefore, their solutions cannot be applied to our problem.
Finally, a framework approach to fairness constraints has shown to be effective in various other applications such as classification [8, 32, 56] , selection of representatives [9] , and personalization [14].
Theoretical Results
Our first result is structural, and gives a characterization of the optimal solution x , to the infinitedimensional fair advertising problem, in terms of a matrix α ∈ R n×m , making it a finite-dimensional optimization problem with respect to α. ∈ R n×m such that if for all j ∈ [m], P j are strictly regular and independent, then the set of allocation rules
, defined below, is optimal for the infinitedimensional fair advertising problem
Where we randomly breaks ties if any (this is equivalent to the allocation rule of the VCG mechanism).
We present the proof of Theorem 4.1 in Section 7.1. In the proof, we analyze the dual of the infinite-dimensional fair advertising problem. We reduce the dual problem to one lagrangian variable, by fixing the lagrangian variables corresponding lower bound (5) and upper bound (6) constraints to their optimal values. The resulting problem turns out to be the dual of the unconstrained revenue maximizing problem, for which Myerson's mechanism is the optimal solution. We interpret the fixed lagrangian variables as shifting the original virtual valuations φ ij . It then follows that for some shift α ∈ R n×m , the α-shifted mechanism (8) is the optimal solution to the infinite-dimensional fair advertising problem. Now, our task is reduced from finding an optimal allocation rule, to finding an α characterizing the optimal allocation rule. Towards this, let us define the revenue, rev shift : R n×m → R and coverage q ij : R n×m → [0, 1] as functions of α
These follow by observing that (8) selects the advertiser with the highest shifted virtual valuation, and then using this allocation rule in Eq. (3) and Eq. (1) respectively. Depending on the nature of the distribution, the gradients ∂rev shift (α) /∂α i and ∂q ij (α) /∂α i may not be monotone in α (e.g., consider the exponential distribution). Therefore, in general neither is rev shift (·) a concave, nor is q ij (·) a convex function of α (see Section B for a concrete example). Hence, this optimization problem is non-convex both in its objective and in its constraints. We require further insights to solve the problem efficiently. Towards this, we observe that revenue is a concave function of q. Consider two optimal allocation rules obtaining coverages q 1 , q 2 ∈ [0, 1] n×m and revenues R 1 , R 2 ∈ R respectively. If we use the first with probability γ ∈ [0, 1], we achieve a coverage γq 1 + (1 − γ)q 2 with revenue γR 1 + (1 − γ)R 2 . Therefore, the optimal allocation rule achieving γq 1 + (1 − γ)q 2 has a revenue of at least γR 1 + (1 − γ)R 2 . This shows that for optimal allocation rules revenue is a concave function of the coverage q.
Let rev : [0, 1] (n−1)×m → R, be the maximum revenue of the platform as a function of coverage q. 2 Consider the following two optimization problems.
(Optimal coverage problem). Find the optimal q ∈ [0, 1] n×m for,
(Optimal shift problem). Given the target coverage δ ∈ [0, 1] n×m , find the optimal α ∈ R n×m for min α∈R n×m
Our next result relates the solution of the above two problems with the infinite-dimensional fair advertising problem.
Theorem 4.2. Given a solution q ∈ [0, 1] n×m to the optimal coverage problem, the solution α to the optimal shift problem with δ = q , defines an optimal α-shifted mechanism (8) for the infinite-dimensional fair advertising problem.
Proof. For any j ∈ [m] adding the all 1 vector, 1 n , to α j does not change the allocation rule in (8) .
Thus, it suffices to show that for all δ ∈ [0, 1] n×m , there is a unique α with
We can show that for all δ ∈ [0, 1] n×m , there is at-least one α ∈ R n×m such that q(α) = δ. In fact, the greedy algorithm which increases all α ij , where q ij (α) < δ ij and i = 1, will find the required α.
To prove it is unique consider distinct α, β ∈ R n×m such that α 1j = β 1j = 0. We can show that q(α) = q(β). In particular, that q i j (α) = q i j (β) for (i , j ) = argmax i∈[n], j∈ [m] |α ij − β ij |. Now, the uniqueness of α follows by contradiction.
The above theorem allows us to find the optimal α by solving the optimal coverage and optimal shift problems. First, let us consider the optimal coverage problem. We already know that its objective is concave. We can further observe that its constraints are linear in q, and in particular, they define a constraint-polytope Q ⊆ [0, 1] n×m . Therefore, it is a convex program, and one approach to solve it is to use gradient-based algorithms.
The problem is that we do not have access to ∇rev. The key idea is that if we let α = q −1 (δ), then we can calculate ∇rev(δ) by solving the following linear-system,
where J q (α) is the Jacobian of vec(q(α)) ∈ R (n−1)m 3 , with respect to vec(α) ∈ R (n−1)m . It turns out that J q (α) is invertible for all α ∈ R n×m (see Section 5.1), and therefore, the above linear-system has an exact solution. Now, let us consider the optimal shift problem. Its objective is non-convex (see Figure 8 (b)). ∇L(α) is a linear combination of ∇q ij (α) for all i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m]. Since J q (α) is invertible, its rows {∇q ij (α)}, are linearly independent, and the gradient is never zero unless we are at the global minimum where α = q −1 (δ). This guarantees that the objective does not have a saddle-point or local-maximum, and that any local-minimum is a global minimum. Using this we can develop an efficient algorithm to solve the optimal coverage problem (Lemma 7.2).
This brings us to our main algorithmic result, which is an algorithm to find the optimal allocation rule for the infinite-dimensional fair advertising problem.
Theorem 4.3. (An algorithm to solve the infinite-dimensional fair advertising problem).
There is an algorithm (Algorithm 1) which outputs α ∈ R n×m such that if assumptions (17), (18), (19) , and (20) are satisfied, the α-shifted mechanism (8) achieves a revenue ε-close to the optimal for the infinite-dimensional fair advertising problem in
Where the arithmetic calculations in each step are bounded by calculating ∇rev once and O hides log factors in n, ρ, η, µ max , 1 /ε and 1 /µ min .
Roughly, the above algorithm has a convergence rate of O( 1 /ε 2 ), under the assumptions which we list below.
Assumptions
, minimum coverage η > 0, lower and upper bounds, µ min and µ max of f ij (·), and a constant ε > 0. Output: Shifts α ∈ R n×m for the optimal mechanism.
1:
Update q t+1 := proj Q (q t + γ∇rev(q t ))
8:
Update α t+1 := Algorithm2(q t , α t , ξ, L, η, µ max , µ min ) 9: end for 10: return α Assumption (17) guarantees that all advertisers have at least an η probability of winning on every type, assumption (18) places lower and upper bounds on the probability density functions of the φ ij , assumption (19) guarantees that the probability density functions of the φ ij are L-Lipschitz continuous, and assumption (20) assumes that the expected φ ij is bounded.
We expect Assumptions (17) and (20) to hold in any real-world setting. We can drop the lower bound in Assumption (18) by introducing "jumps" in α to avoid ranges where the measure of bids is small. Removing assumption (19) would be an interesting direction for future work.
Remark 4.4. We inherit the assumption of independent and regular distributions from Myerson. In addition, we require the the distributions of valuations are strictly regular to guarantee that ties between advertisers happen with 0 probability. We can drop this assumption by incorporating a randomized tie-breaking rule which retains fairness. The above allocation rule is monotone and allocates the ad spot to the bidder with the highest shifted valuation φ ij + α ij for a given user. Thus, it defines a unique truthful mechanism and corresponding payment rule.
Our Algorithm
Algorithm 1 performs a projected gradient descent to find the optimal q ∈ Q (11). It starts with an initial coverage q 1 ∈ Q, and the corresponding shift α 1 = q −1 (q 1 ). At step k, it calculates the gradient ∇rev(q k ), by solving the linear-system in Eq. (16) . To solve this linear-system, we need to calculate J q (α k ) and ∇rev shift (α k ). This can be done in O(n 2 m) steps if we have α k = q −1 (q k ) (see Remark 5.3). Therefore, the algorithm requires a "good" approximation of α at each step, it maintains this by "updating" the previous approximation α k−1 using Algorithm 2 to approximately solve the optimal-shift problem (15) .
After calculating ∇rev(q k ), it takes a gradient step and projects the current iterate on Q in O((nm) ω ) time (Section 5.2), where ω is the fast matrix multiplication coefficient. It takes roughly O( 1 /ε 2 ) steps to obtain an ε-accurate solution, and then returns its current shift α ≈ α . We can bound the error introduced by the approximation of α k at each step by ensuring that Algorithm 2 has sufficient accuracy. In particular, if it is O(ε 2 ) accurate we can prove that Algorithm 1 converges in O( 1 /ε 2 ) steps.
Next, we give the details of the projecting on Q and calculating the gradient ∇rev.
Calculating and Bounding ∇rev(·)
We fix the shift of one advertiser i ∈ [n] for each type j ∈ [m]. Let J q (α) be the Jacobian of the vectorized coverage, vec(q(α)) ∈ R (n−1)m , with respect to the vectorized shift, vec(α) ∈ R (n−1)m . Then, J q (α) is a (n − 1)m × (n − 1)m matrix
. . .
To obtain ∇rev(q), we use the fact that J q (α) is always invertible (Lemma 5.2). Given α = q −1 (δ) for some δ ∈ [0, 1] n×m , we can calculate ∇rev(δ) by solving
Or equivalently by solving the linear-system in Eq. (16).
Remark 5.1. J q (α) is invertible iff we fix the shift α ij of one advertiser i ∈ [n] for each type j ∈ [m]. Intuitively, if we increase the α ij for all i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m] by the same amount, then q remains invariant. This implies that each row of J q (α) has 0 sum, or that J q (α) is not invertible.
Lemma 5.2. (Jacobian is invertible).
For all α ∈ R (n−1)×m , if all advertisers have non-zero coverage for all types j ∈ [m], then J q (α) ∈ R (n−1)·m×(n−1)·m is invertible.
Proof. The coverage remains invariant if the bids of all advertisers are uniformly shifted for any given user type j. Therefore, for all j ∈ [m] we have
Since, increasing the shift α ij , does not increase the coverage q kj for any k = i, we have that
Now, from Equation (21) we have
Further since the n-th advertiser has non-zero coverage, i.e., there is non-zero probability that advertiser n bids higher than all other advertisers, changing α nj must affect all other advertisers. In other words, for all i ∈ [n − 1]
∂q ij ∂α nj = 0. Using this we have, By observing that q ij , on user type j, is independent of the α st , of any user type t such that t = j, i.e.,
and using Equation (23), we get that the Jacobian, J q (α) is strictly diagonally dominant. Now, by the properties of strictly dominant matrices it is invertible.
Remark 5.3. For all i, s ∈ [n] such that i = s, q ij is independent of α st (25) . Therefore, that Jacobian J q (α) is sparse. and the linear-system in Eq. (16) can be solved in O(n ω m) steps, where ω is the fast matrix multiplication coefficient.
Projection on the Constraint Polytope (Q)
Given any point q ∈ [0, 1] n×m , by determining the constraints it violates, we can express the projection on the constraint polytope Q, as a quadratic program with equality constraints. Using this we can construct a projection oracle proj Q , which given a point q ∈ [0, 1] n×m projects it onto Q in O((nm) ω ) arithmetic operations, where ω is the fast matrix multiplication coefficient.
Empirical Study
We evaluate our approach empirically on the Yahoo! A1 dataset [53] . We vary the strength of the fairness constraint for all advertisers, find an optimal fair mechanism F using Algorithm 1 and compare it against the optimal unconstrained (and hence potentially unfair) mechanism M, which is given by Myerson [37] . We first consider the impact of the fairness constraints on the revenue of the platform. Let rev N denote the revenue of mechanism N . We report the revenue ratio κ M,F := rev F/rev M . Note that the revenue of F can be at most that of M, as it solves a constrained version of the same problem; thus κ M,F ∈ [0, 1]. We then consider the impact of the fairness constraints on the advertisers. Towards this, we consider the distribution of winners among advertisers in an auction given by M and an auction given by F. We report the total variation distance
between the two distributions, as a measure of how much the winning distribution changes due to the fairness constraints.
Lastly, we consider the fairness of the resultant mechanism F. To this end, we measure selection lift (slift) achieved by F, slift(F) := min i∈[n],j∈[m] ( q ij/1−q ij ) ∈ [0, 1]. Where slift(F) = 1, represents perfect fairness among the two user types.
Dataset
We use the Yahoo! A1 dataset [53] , which contains bids placed by advertisers on the top 1000 keywords on Yahoo! Online Auctions between June 15, 2002 and June 14, 2003. The dataset has 10475 advertisers, and each advertiser places bids on a subset of keywords; there are approximately 2 · 10 7 bids in the dataset.
For each keyword k, let A k be the set of advertisers that bid on it. We infer the distribution of valuation of an advertiser for a keyword by the bids they place on the keyword. In order to retain sufficiently rich valuation profiles for each advertiser, we remove advertisers who place less than 1000 bids on k or whose valuations have variance lower than 3 · 10 −3 from A k , and then those who win the auction less than 5% of the time. This retains more than 1.5 · 10 7 bids.
The actual keywords in the dataset are anonymized; hence, in order to determine whether two keywords k 1 and k 2 are related, we consider whether they share more that one advertiser, i.e., A k 1 ∩ A k 2 > 1. This allows us to identify keywords that are related (see Figure 2 (b)), and hence for which spillover effects may be present as described in [34] . Drawing that analogy, one can think of each keyword in the pair as a different type of user for which the same advertisers are competing, and the goal would be for the advertiser to win an equal proportion of each user. There are 14, 380 such pairs. However, we observe that spillover does not affect all keyword pairs (see Figure 2(a) ). To test the effect of imposing fairness constrains in a challenging setting, we consider only the auctions which are not already fair; in particular there are 3282 keyword pairs which are less than = 0.3 fair.
Experimental Setup
As we only consider pairs of keywords in this experiment, a lower bound constraint 11 = δ is equivalent to an upper bound constraint u 12 = 1 − δ. Hence, it suffices to consider lower bound constraints. We set i1 = i2 = ∀ i ∈ [2] , and vary uniformly from 0 to 0.5 , i.e., from the completely unconstrained case (which is equivalent to Myerson's action) to completely constrained case (which requires each advertiser to win each keywords in the pair with exactly the same probability). We report κ N ,M , d T V (N , M), and slift(F) averaged over all auctions after 10 4 iterations in Figure 3 and Figure 4 ; error bars represent the standard error of the mean over 10 4 iterations and 3282 auctions respectively. Remark 6.1. Computationally, we could consider more types (m). The bottleneck is empirical; whether the dataset contains enough keywords with m overlapping advertisers for the experiment to be meaningful. For m < 7 we get over 1000 such keywords sets, and observe results similar to m = 2 case, losing less than 5% of the revenue with a TV-distance smaller than 0.05 even for the setting with = 0.5.
Empirical Results
Fairness. Since the auctions are unbalanced to begin with, we expect the selection lift to increase with the fairness constraint. We observe a growing trend in the selection lift, eventually achieving perfect fairness for = 0.5.
Revenue Ratio. We do not expect to outperform the optimal unconstrained mechanism. However, we observe that even in the perfectly balanced setting with = 0.5 our mechanisms lose less than 5% of the revenue.
Advertiser Displacement. Since the auctions are unbalanced to begin with, we expect TV-distance to grow with the fairness constraint. We observe this growing trend in the TV-distance on lowering the risk-difference. Even for zero risk-difference ( = 0.5) our mechanisms obtain a TV-distance smaller than 0.05. We present a discussion of this result in Section C.
Proofs
The second integral is well defined by from the continuity of γ j (·) and monotonic nature of x j (·).
In order for the supremum of the Lagrangian over x ij (·) ≥ 0 to be bounded, the coefficient of x ij (·) must be non-positive. Therefore we require that for all g ⊆ supp(φ j ), i ∈ [n], and j ∈ [m]
Since x ij (·) and γ j (·) are continuous, we can equivalently require for all φ j , i ∈ [n], and j ∈ [m]
If this holds, we can express the supremum of L as sup
Now we can express the dual optimization problem as follows:
(Dual of the infinite-dimensional fair advertising problem). For all j ∈ [m], find a optimal α j ∈ R n ≥0 , β j ∈ R n ≥0 and γ j (·) :
Since the primal is linear in x ij (·), and the constraints are feasible strong duality holds. Therefore, the dual optimal is primal optimal. u ij − 1 ≥ 0. Since α and β are non-negative, a optimal solution to the dual is finite. Let α , β be a optimal solutions to the dual, and x ij (·) be a optimal solution to the primal. Fixing α and β to their optimal values α and β in the dual, let us define new virtual valuations φ ij , for all i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m]
(α it it − β it u it ) .
Then the leftover problem has only one Lagrangian multiplier, γ j (·). Let γ j (·) be the affine transformation of γ j defined on virtual valuations, i.e., γ j (φ j ) := γ j (φ j ), then the problem can be expressed as follows.
(Dual with shifted virtual valuations). For all j ∈ [m], find the optimal γ j (·) :
This is the dual of the following unconstrained revenue maximizing problem. Myerson's mechanism is the revenue maximizing solution to the unconstrained optimization problem. Further, by linearity and feasibility of constraints strong duality holds. Therefore the α -shifted mechanism, for α
is a optimal fair mechanism.
(Unconstrained primal for the infinite-dimensional fair advertising problem). For all j ∈ [m], find the optimal allocation rule x j (·) :
Further, Myerson's mechanism is truthful if the distribution of valuations are regular and independent. Since α-shifted mechanism applies a constant shift to all valuation, it follows under the same assumptions that any α-shifted mechanism is also truthful, and therefore has a unique payment rule defined by its allocation rule.
Proof of Theorem 4.3
Supporting Lemmas. Towards the proof of Theorem 4.3 we require the following two Lemmas. The first lemma shows that rev(·) is Lipschitz continuous. Its proof is presented in Section 7.3.
Lemma 7.1. (Revenue is Lipschitz).
For all coverages q 1 , q 2 ∈ Q, if assumptions (17), (18) and (20) are satisfied, then
The next lemma is an algorithm to solve the optimal shift problem. Its proof is presented in Section 7.4
Lemma 7.2. (An algorithm to solve the optimal shift problem). There is an algorithm (Algorithm 2) which outputs α ∈ R n×m such that if assumptions (17) , (18) and (19) are satisfied, then α is an ε-optimal solution for the optimal shift problem, i.e., L(α) < ε, in log mL(α 1 ) ε n 3 (L + n 2 µ 2 max ) (ηµ min ) 2 steps.
Where the arithmetic operations in each step are bounded by calculating ∇L once.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. Starting from q 0 ∈ Q, Algorithm 1 performs a projected gradient descent on Q. Since Q is convex, the projection is contractive. In particular, for the optimal q ∈ Q ∀ q, proj
It queries the shift α k ≈ q −1 (q k ) from Algorithm 2 at each step. This introduces some error ξ > 0 at each step, which we fix later in the proof. Let z k+1 = q k + γ∇rev(q k ) be the coverage at the k + 1-th gradient-step, and q k+1 = q(α k+1 ) be the coverage obtained by querying α k ≈ q −1 (proj Q (q k+1 )). Then, we have the following bound on the error
(Error from Algorithm 2, 32)
We know that rev(·) is a concave function of q. Using the first-order condition of concavity at q and q k we have
Using the triangle inequality with Eq. (31) and (32) we get
Expanding the above recurrence we get
Substituting q k+1 − q 2 2 ≥ 0, and q 1 − q 2 2 ≤ 1 we get
Replacing rev(q i ) by its maximum, choosing ξ := G 2 γ 2 , and using ∇rev(q i ) 2 ≤ G and
At each step we perform a small update to q k and query α k , therefore, Algorithm 2 is always warm-started, i.e., z k+1 − q k 2 2 < Gγ. Now, from Lemma 7.2 the total steps required to update α are
The sum of the total gradient steps by Algorithm 1, and the total gradient steps by all calls of Algorithm 2 is
Using G = ( µmaxρ /µ min η) · n 2 (from Lemma 7.1) we have that Algorithm 1 gets an ε-approximation of optimal revenue in
Where O hides log factors in n, ρ, η, µ max , 1 /ε and 1 /µ min .
Proof of Lemma 7.1
We use Lemma 7.3 and Lemma 7.4 in the proof of Lemma 7.1. The two lemmas split the Lipschitz continuity of rev(·) into the Lipschitz continuity of rev shift (·) and α ij = q −1 ij (·) respectively. Their proofs are follow in Section 7.3.1 and Section 7.3.2 respectively.
Lemma 7.3. (Revenue is Lipschitz continuous in shifts)
. For all α ∈ R (n−1)×m , if pdf, f ij (φ) of the virtual valuations is bounded above by µ max , and φ ij is bounded above by
. (Shifts is Lipschitz continuous in coverage)
. For all α, β ∈ R (n−1)×m , such that q ij (β + t(α − β)) > η, if the probability density function, f ij (·), of virtual valuations is bounded by µ min and
Proof of Lemma 7.1. Let α, β ∈ R (n−1)×m be the shifts achieving q 1 and q 2 respectively. Then by Lemma 7.3 and Lemma 7.4 we have
By combining Equation (37) and Equation (38) we get the required result Figure 5 : Gradient of rev shift,j (·). Equations from the proof of Lemma 7.3.
Proof of Lemma 7.3
Proof. We first consider the revenue for one user type j, rev shift, j (α), and then combine the result across all user type to show that rev shift (α) is Lipschitz continuous. Formally, we define rev shift, j (α) as
(Revenue from type j, 40)
Then the total revenue rev shift (α) is just a sum of rev shift, j (α) for all user types
We can express ∇rev shift, j (α) as shown in Figure 5 . We can observe that every term in the gradient (Equation (41), Equation (42)) is a linear function of f ij (·) and F ij (·) for some i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m]. Since, each term in the gradient (Equation (41)) involves at most 2n terms of the form of Equation (43) for some i, k, ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m],
Bounding this term, for all i, k, ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m] by µ max ρ would give us a bound on ∇rev shift (α). To this end, consider
≤ µ max ρ.
For all k ∈ [n], let terms t 1 (k) and t 2 (k) be defined as follows
Then rewriting the gradient, from Figure 5 , we have
Now calculating the Frobenius norm of rev shift, j (α) we get
Now, we proceed to bound ∇rev shift (α)
Therefore, it follows that ∇rev shift (α) F ≤ n 3 2 ρµ max .
Proof of Lemma 7.4
Technical Lemmas. We use the following lemmas in the proof of Lemma 7.4. The first lemma is a lower bound on the derivative q ij (α), and follows from assumptions (17) and (18). 
Proof. Each advertiser has at least η coverage on every type, i.e., we have for
Now considering
we get
≥ ηµ min .
In the next lemma we extend the lower bound to the directional derivative of q ij (α).
Lemma 7.6. (Lower bound of directional derivative of q ij (α)). Given a shift α j ∈ R n−1 , t max > 0, and a direction vector u ∈ R n−1 , s.t. u 2 = 1, if the probability density function, f ij (·), of virtual valuations is bounded below by µ min and bounded above by µ max ∀ i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m], and
Proof. Consider i ∈ argmax k∈[n−1] |u k |. Advertiser i's bids are being increased faster than or equal to any other advertiser's. Recalling that the shift of advertiser n, α ij = 0 for all user types j ∈ [m], using Equation (10) we can express q ij (tu + α) and its gradient as shown in Figure 6 . Since i ∈ argmax k∈[n−1] |u k |, we have
Since u 2 = i∈[n−1] |u i | 2 = 1, we can lower bound |u i | 2 , the maximum coordinate of u ∈ R n−1 by magnitude by
Multiplying Equation (55) with sign(u i ) and using Equation (56) and the fact that the integrals involved are positive to lower bound the equation we get
Proof of Lemma 7.4. Consider a type j ∈ [m] and the corresponding shifts α j , β j ∈ R n , where α j , β j are the j-th columns of α and β respectively. Let u := α j − β j , then from Lemma 7.6 we have
Consider this i, then from the fundamental theorem of calculus we have
Using Equation (58) for every type j ∈ [m] we get that q(α) − q(β) F > (ηµ min ) 2 /n · α − β F .
Proof of Lemma 7.2
The following remark gives insight, allowing us to use a gradient-based algorithm to solve the optimal shift problem.
, an approximate shift α 1 ∈ R n×m , a constant ξ > 0 that controls the accuracy, Lipschitz constant L > 0 of f ij (·), the minimum coverage η > 0, and the lower and upper bounds, µ min and µ max , of f ij (·).
Output: An approximation α ∈ R n×m of shifts for δ.
Update α t+1 := α t − γ∇L(α t ) 6: end for 7: return α Remark 7.7. We observe that ∇L = 2 i,j (q ij (α) − δ ij )∇q ij (α) is a linear combination of the rows, {∇q ij }, of J q (α). Since {∇q ij (α)} are linearly independent, ∇L = 0 unless we are at the global minimum where δ = q(α). This guarantees that L(·) does not have any saddle-points or local-maxima, and that any local minimum is a global minimum. Now, to get an efficient complexity with a gradient-based algorithm we want to avoid small gradients "far" from the optimal. Lemma 7.8 shows that if L(α) greater than ε, then the Frobenius norm
The proof of Lemma 7.8 is provided in Section 7.4.1. The proof of Lemma 7.8 is provided in Section 7.4.1.
Lemma 7.8. (Lower bounding ∇L j (·)). Given α j ∈ R n−1 , such that L j (α j ) > ε and q ij (α j ) > η, if the probability density function, f ij (·), of virtual valuations is bounded below by
Next, in Lemma 7.9 we show that the gradient, ∇L(α), is O(n(L + n 2 µ 2 max ))-Lipschitz continuous. Therefore, at each step where L(α) ≥ ξ, we improve the loss by a factor of 1 − βξ, where β does not depend on ξ. This gives us a complexity bound of O(log 1 /ε). The proof of Lemma 7.9 is presented in Section 7.4.2.
Lemma 7.9. (Gradient of L(·) is Lipschitz).
If the probability density function, f ij (φ), of the virtual valuations, φ ij is L-Lipschitz continuous and bounded above by µ max , then ∇L j (α j ) is O(n(L + n 2 µ 2 max ))-Lipschitz. Now, at each step, if the loss is greater than ξ, we get an improvement by a factor of 1 − βξ, where β does not depend on ξ. This gives us a complexity bound of O(log 1 /ε).
Proof of Lemma 7.2. At each iteration of the algorithm we calculate ∇L j (α) for all j ∈ [m], i.e., we calculate ∇L(α). We note that this bounds the arithmetic calculations at one iteration. We recall from Equation (25) that the shift for one user type do not affect the coverage for the other. Therefore we can independently find a optimal shift α j for all each user type j ∈ [m]. From Lemma 7.1 we have that
max )), for brevity. We can get an upper bound to L j (α k ) from the first order approximation of L j at α k , further using the update rule
Let λ := 2 n−1 ηµ min , then from Lemma 7.8 we have that ∇L j (α) is lower bounded by L j (α k )λ. Using this to lower bound the gradient we get
By the above recurrence we get
steps.
Proof of Lemma 7.8
In the proof of Lemma 7.8 we use Lemma 7.10, which shows that any linear combination of ∇q ij (α) for all i ∈ [n], with reasonably "large" weights is lower bounded. We note that Lemma 7.10 does not follow from linear independence of ∇q ij (α) ∀ i ∈ [n] (Lemma 5.2), because linear combinations of linearly independent vectors can be arbitrary small while having "large" weights.
Lemma 7.10. Given x ∈ R n−1 such that x 1 > 1, if for all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m] the probability density function, f ij (·), of virtual valuations is bounded below by µ min , and q ij (α j ) > η coverage on every user type j ∈ [m], then
Proof. Without loss of generality consider a reordering of (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ), s.t. for some p ≤ n − 1
We can replace x by −x, since this does not change the norm i∈[n−1] x i ∇q ij (α j ) 2 . Now replacing p by (n − p − 1) we get case B.
The coverage remains invariant if the bids of all advertisers are uniformly shifted for any given user type j. (α 1j , α 2j , . . . , α nj ). Therefore we have for all i ∈ [n − 1]
Calculating the weighted sum of Equation (63) 
with weights x i we get
On rearranging the LHS we get
Therefore, by the pigeonhole principle on elements of the outer sum,
From Equation (22) for all i ∈ [p] and k > p,
Therefore,
.
Further, using
From these we have that
Considering
From Lemma 7.10 we have
Figure 7: Hessian of q ij (·). Equations from proof of Lemma 7.11.
Proof of Lemma 7.9
In order to show that the loss L(·) is O(n(L + n 2 µ 2 max ))-Lipschitz continuous, we first show that ∇q ij is 2n(L + nµ 2 max )-Lipschitz continuous. To this end, we show that the elements of ∇ 2 q ij are bounded (Lemma 7.11), and then use Lemma 7.12 (Corollary 1.2 in [48] ) to bound the magnitudes of the eigen-values.
Lemma 7.11. Given α j ∈ R n , if pdf, f ij (φ) of the virtual valuations, φ ij is L-Lipschitz continuous and bounded above by µ max , then elements in the main diagonal of the Hessian, ∇ 2 q ij (α j ) are bounded in absolute value by n(L + nµ 2 max ), and all other elements are bounded in absolute value by L + nµ 2 max , i.e.,
Proof. Consider the Hessian of q ij (α j ) in Figure 7 , which follows from differentiating Equation 10 with respect to α j , where α j is the j-th column of α. We note that q ij αst = 0 for any t = j, for all i, s ∈ [n] and j, t ∈ [m], and so we only need to calculate the gradient with respect to α j .
We can observe that for all i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m] every term in the Hessian is linear function of f ij (y), f ij (y) and F ij (y). In particular each term in the Hessian is a sum of the following terms, for
Each term along the diagonal of the Hessian (Equation (70)),
, is a combination of (n − 1) terms of the form Equation (74), and n 2 terms of the form Equation (75). All other terms in the Hessian contain at most n terms of the form Equation (75), and 1 term of the form Equation (74). Bounding these terms for all i, k, ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m] by µ 2 max would give us a bound on terms of the Hessian, which in turn gives bounds on the eigen-values of the Hessain. To this end, recall that for all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m], and y ∈ supp(f ij )
We can now bound Equation (74) and Equation (75) f ij (y)dy
(75)
Now we have for all k, i ∈ [n], s.t., k = i
(80),(81)
≤ L (83)
. |A ij |.
We refer the reader to [48] for a proof of the above lemma.
Proof of Lemma 7.9. To show that ∇L j (α j ) is Lipschitz continuous, we show that q ij (α j ) is Lipschitz continuous, then use the fact that ∇q ij (α j ) is Lipschitz continuous from Lemma 7.12, and that δ j and q ij (·) have bounded sums if the loss is greater than ε. To this end we recall
Consider the following term for some i, k ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m]
Now we can express
and k = i as follows 
Since q ij (α j ) and δ ij represent the probabilities of advertisers winning they sum to 1. Therefore, for all user type j ∈ [m], their sum is bounded by 1, i.e., i∈[n] q ij (α j ) ≤ 1 and i∈[n] δ ij ≤ 1.
Using the triangle inequality we get
We represent the Hessian ∇ 2 q ij (α j ) by H(α j ) for brevity. Then the Hessian of L(·) is
We know from Lemma 7.12 that the eigen-values of H(α j ) are bounded in absolute value by 2n(L + nµ 2 max ). We also know that the only non-zero eigen-value of vv for any vector v is v 2 2 . Let X be the spectral-norm of matrix X, which is defined as the maximum singular value of X. Then, since singular-values are absolute values of the eigen-values the spectral norm of H(α j ) and vv are bounded. Specifically,
Now, we use the sub-additivity of the spectral-norm (represented as · )
(Sub-additivity of · , 94)
This gives us the following
, and the eigen-values of ∇ 2 L j (α j ) are bounded in absolute value by O(n(L + n 2 µ 2 max )).
Limitations and Future Work
This work leaves several interesting directions open. On the technical side, it would be interesting to improve Theorem 4.3 by weakening the assumptions on the distributions, or by deriving better complexity bounds in terms of ε or n. Although our algorithm works for intersectional types, it considers a separate constraint for each intersection. Since there can be exponentially many intersections compared to the types, it would be important to improve the run-time in this setting. Exploring the utility lost from the advertiser's perspective, and potential ways of bounding it would also be of interest. Further, it would be relevant to extend our framework to the (non-truthful) general second price auction [19, 50] , which is used to auction multiple ad slots together.
From a practical standpoint, a natural problem is that advertisers run their campaigns at different times; while an ad campaign is running on the platform, several other campaigns start and finish. Our framework does not account for this. Further, we do not ensure that users of different types derive similar value from an ad. An advertiser could intentionally design an ad to appeal to a specific type, and then, even though the ad receives a balanced coverage, it could generate biased value for users [45] .
Finally on the empirical side, testing our framework in the field and studying how the constraints affect user satisfaction, and the profile of ads they see would be important.
Conclusion
We initiate a formal study of designing mechanisms for online ad auctions that can ensure advertisements are not shown disproportionately to different populations. This is especially relevant for ads for employment opportunities, housing, and other regulated markets where biases in the recipient population can be illegal and/or unethical. As has been shown recently, existing platforms suffer from various spillover effects that result in such biased distributions. Our approach places constraints on the allocations achieved by an ad across different sub-populations in order to ensure balanced exposure of the content. It can be used flexibly placing constraints on some or all advertisers, across some or all sub-populations, and varying the tightness of the constraint depending on the level of fairness desired.
We present a truthful mechanism which attains the optimal revenue while satisfying the constraints necessary to attain such fairness, and present an efficient algorithm for finding this mechanism given the advertiser properties and fairness constraints. Empirically, we observe that our mechanisms can satisfy fairness constraints at a minor loss to the revenue of the platform, even when the constraints ensure it attains perfect fairness. Hence, fairness is not necessarily at odds with maximizing the platform's ad revenue. Furthermore, we show empirically that advertisers are not significantly impacted with respect to their winning percentages -the sub-populations their ads are shown to change to be fair, but overall they are still reach a similar number of users.
Let the two advertisers have an equal budget of $30. Both of them place a bid of $1, if they target the current user and otherwise place a bid of $0. For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that men and women visit the platform alternately. Consider an auction mechanism that shows the ad of the highest bidder. If there is more than one bidder with the same highest bid, the auction mechanism chooses one uniformly at random.
Whenever a man visits the webpage, the second advertiser places a bid of $1, while the first advertiser places a bid of $0. Therefore, the mechanism always shows the second advertiser's ad.Whereas when a women visits the platform, both the advertisers place a bid of $1, and one of them shows the advertisement with a 50% probability.
Consider the point when 40 users have visited the platform, 20 men and 20 women. The second advertiser has shown 20 ads to men, and 10 ads to women. Whereas the first advertiser has only displays 10 ads to females. Having shown 30 ads, the second advertiser has finished the budget, and leaves the auction, while the first advertiser stays till another 20 women visit the platform.
In such a situation, the second advertiser who meant the ad to be unbiased among users, ends up under-representing women in the viewers of the ad.
B Revenue is Non-Concave in α
Consider two advertisers and one user type with f 11 (x) = e −x and f 21 (x) = e −x . We fix the shift of advertiser 2 to 0, and consider a positive shift α ≥ 0 of advertiser 1. Then rev shift (α) = Coverage for one of the two advertisers with exponentially distributed bids, on two user types. We vary the shift of one of the advertisers and report its coverage as a function of the shift. Differentiating rev shift we can observe it is not a concave function of the shift α (see Figure 9 (a)). Indeed if we consider Similarly we can observe that q is not a convex function of α (see Figure 8(a) ). Using q(α) to formulate the loss L(α) we can easily observe that it is non-convex as well (see Figure 8(b) ). Let us re-parameterize the revenue rev shift in terms of q as rev(·). Then we have rev(1 − q) = 1 + (1 − q)(1 − log(2 − 2q))) (95)
We can observe that revenue is a concave function of the coverage (see Figure 9 (b)).
C Why Is the TV-Distance Small?
To calculate the TV-distance we consider the distribution of winners selected by the auction mechanism, i.e., the distribution of the number of users an advertiser reaches. This distribution is different from coverage which separates the audience by their types. We report the total variation distance 
Since the coverage is uniform, it satisfies the perfect fairness constraints. Further, using Eq. 96 we can observe that this projection has a 0 total variation distance d T V to {q ij (M)} j∈ [m] . If the solution q ij (F) of the optimal fair mechanism is close to this projection, then the resulting d T V (M, F) is small. Moving the coverage q ij (F) away from the projection involves a trade-off between increasing the total change in coverage, and decreasing the change for some types the advertiser values more.
Therefore, if the average bid of an advertiser does not vary significantly between the types, then q ij (F) is close to the projection. Importantly, this does not imply that the coverages q ij (M) of the unconstrained mechanism are balanced. To gain some intuition, consider two advertisers with similar budgets, but one advertiser places a bid of 1 + ε for men and 1 − ε for women, while the other places a bid of 1 for men and women. Even though the first advertiser's bid for men is only 2ε higher than their bid for women, they would only reach men, i.e., q 1 = (1, 0) . Whereas, the platform only loses just ε fraction of its revenue by changing q 1 to its projection ( 1 /2, 1 /2).
